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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the anti-retaliation provision in section
15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act apply to
retaliation by an employer against a job applicant?
(2) Is the private cause action provided by sec
tion 16(b) of the FLSA available to a job applicant
who is retaliated against by an employer?

11

LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to this action are set out in the
caption.
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Petitioner Natalie R. Dellinger respectfully prays
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals entered on August 12, 2011.
-------------------- ♦-----------------

OPINIONS BELOW
The August 12, 2011 opinion of the Court of
Appeals, which is reported at 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir.
2011), is set out at pp. la-26a of the Appendix. The
October 7, 2011 order of the Court of Appeals denying
rehearing en banc, which is not reported, is set out at
p. 40a of the Appendix. The April 2, 2010 Memoran
dum Opinion of the District Court, which is unoffi
cially reported at 2010 WL 1375263 (E.D.Va.), is set
out at pp. 27a-39a of the Appendix.
-------------------- +---------------------

JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered
on October 7, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction pur
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
--------------♦-------------STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 3(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 203(a), provides:
“Person” means any individual, partnership,
association, corporation, business trust, legal
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representative, or any organized group of
persons.
Section 3(e)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), provides in pertinent part
“ ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an
employer.”
Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), provides in pertinent part:
(a)

... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person *

*

%

(3) to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter, or has testified
or is about to testify in any such pro
ceeding....
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), provides in pertinent part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of
section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable
for such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of sec
tion 215(a)(3) of this title, including without
limitation employment, reinstatement, pro
motion, and the payment of wages lost and
an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages. An action to recover the liability
prescribed in ... the preceding sentence[]
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may be maintained against any employer
(including a public agency) in any Federal or
State court of competent jurisdiction by any
one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated.
-------------------- ♦--------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition concerns a startling Fourth Circuit
decision which the government has correctly described
as creating an “untenable gap in [the] coverage”1
provided by the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. A sharply divided court of
appeals has held that the FLSA permits an employer
to expressly refuse to hire any job applicant who has
ever filed a suit under the FLSA or complained to the
Department of Labor. That decision poses a serious
threat to the enforceability of the FLSA, and frames
an important question of law which should be settled
by this Court.
In July 2009 petitioner Dellinger brought suit
against her former employer, CACI, Inc., for alleged
violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime
provisions. About the same time she applied for a
job with the defendant, Science Applications Inter
national Corporation. In late August 2009, Science
Applications offered Dellinger a position, contingent
1 Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4.
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on her passing a drug test, completing certain forms,
and verifying and transferring her security clearance.
Dellinger accepted the offer and began the process of
satisfying the contingencies. (App. 3a, 28a).
Dellinger filled out the required forms and passed
the drug test. On one form which Science Applica
tions required her to complete, Dellinger was asked to
identify any pending civil litigation to which she was
a party. She listed her then pending FLSA action
against CACI, Inc. Several days after Dellinger sub
mitted her completed form, Science Applications with
drew its offer of employment. (App. 3a, 29a). Science
Applications gave Dellinger no explanation for its
decision to cancel the job offer it had made to her only
days earlier.
Dellinger commenced this action against Science
Applications, alleging that it had retaliated against
her by withdrawing its job offer because of her FLSA
lawsuit against CACI.2 The plaintiff asserted that
Science Applications’ action violated section 15(a)(3)
of the Act, which forbids retaliation in reprisal for the
assertion of rights under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3).
Science Applications moved to dismiss the com
plaint for failure to state a claim. It contended that
15(a)(3) permits a prospective employer to reject a job

2

2010.

The FLSA action against CACI was settled in January
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applicant because he or she had previously filed an
action under the FLSA. The District Court granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The
district judge held that a job applicant is not an
“employee” within the meaning of the FLSA,3 and
thus is not entitled to the protections of section
15(a)(3). (App. 31a, 34a-35a).
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The central issue on appeal was whether Dellinger
was an “employee” within the meaning of the FLSA.
Section 15(a)(3) forbids retaliation against “any em
ployee” and the remedial provision of the Act, section
16(b), authorizes suits by “any employee.” A majority
of the court of appeals held that “employee” means
only an individual who is “in an employment relation
ship with” the employer that is alleged to have vio
lated section 15(a)(3) and that is sued under section
16(b). (App. 7a). The Fourth Circuit therefore con
cluded that a job applicant (such as Dellinger) is not
an employee. “This presents the question of whether
an applicant for employment is an ‘employee’.... [W]e
conclude that ... an applicant is not an employee.”
(App. 6a).

3
App. 31a (“Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show
that she was an ‘employee’ of [Science Applications] within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)” ), 35a (“Without reading be
yond the plain language of the statute, a job applicant cannot be
considered an ‘employee.’ ”).
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Although she was an applicant for employ
ment with Science Applications and her
application had been approved on a con
tingent basis, she never began work.... [A]n
applicant who never began or performed any
work could not, by the language of the FLSA,
be an ‘employee.’
(App. 8a).
Based on its view that a job applicant is not an
“employee” within the scope of the FLSA, the panel
majority ruled that section 15(a)(3) “permit[s] future
employers effectively to discriminate against prospec
tive employees for having exercised their rights under
the FLSA in the past.” (App. 11a). “[W]e hold that the
FLSA anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3),
does not authorize prospective employees to bring
retaliation claims against prospective employers.”
(App. 12a). “Congress was ... providing protection to
those in an employment relationship with their em
ployer.” (App. 6a-7a; see App. 10a (insisting there is
no authority for “extend[ing] FLSA protections to
applicants or prospective employees.”))
The panel majority also held that, regardless of
whether an employer engaged in conduct which vio
lated the rights of a job applicant, section 16(b) of the
FLSA does not authorize prospective employees to file
lawsuits against employers. “[W]e conclude that the
FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only his or
her current or former employer and that a prospec
tive employee cannot sue a prospective employer.”
(App. 2a-3a). “[T]here is ... no remedy for an employee
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to sue anyone but his employer for violations of the
anti-retaliation provision.” (App. 9a).
Because an employee is given remedies ...
only from an employer, Dellinger could only
sue Science Applications if she could show
that she was an employee and that Science
Applications was her employer. Yet Dellinger
cannot make that showing.
(App. 7a-8a) (emphasis added). “§216(b) provides that
... employees may sue only their employers for retali
ation.” (App. 7a) (emphasis added and omitted).
Judge King dissented. The term “employee,” he
argued, is sufficiently ambiguous that it could include
a prospective employee. (App. 17a, 18a). Because sec
tion 15(a)(3) was intended to prevent fear of reprisals
from deterring workers from asserting their rights
under the FLSA, Judge King reasoned, section 15(a)(3)
should be construed to forbid retaliation against pro
spective employees, and section 16(b) should be in
terpreted to authorize civil actions by prospective
employees. (App. 23a-25a). The majority opinion,
Judge King objected, was inconsistent with this
Court’s interpretation of the term “employee” in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). (App.
12a, 14a).
Dellinger filed a timely petition for rehearing en
banc. On October 7, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied
the petition for rehearing. (App. 40a).
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The Department of Labor, together with the
EEOC,4 filed a brief in the original appeal5 and a
second brief with regard to the petition for rehearing
en banc.6 Both briefs contended that section 15(a)(3)
forbids an employer from retaliating against job ap
plicants and that section 16(b) provides a private
cause of action to a job applicant who was the victim
of such retaliation. In its brief regarding rehearing
en banc, the government argued that the panel
opinion was inconsistent with this Court’s decisions
in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. and several other cases.
(See pp. 14-15, 20-21, infra).
--------------♦-------------REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Fourth Circuit has held that the Fair Labor
Standards Act permits an employer to retaliate
against a job applicant for having filed an action
under the Act, and provides to job applicants no cause
of action against a retaliatory employer. The govern
ment has correctly described that court of appeals
4 The EEOC joined these briefs because complaints and
legal actions under the Equal Pay Act are protected by the anti
retaliation provision of section 15(a)(3) and the private cause of
action in section 16(b).
5 Brief for the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant (“Department of Labor Merits Brief”).
6 Brief for the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae (“Department of
Labor Rehearing Brief”).
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opinion as threatening to “drastically weaken the
FLSA’s anti-retaliation protection.”7
Enforcement of the wage and hour and overtime
provisions of the Act depends upon “information and
complaints received from employees seeking to vindi
cate rights claimed to have been denied.” Mitchell v.
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292
(1960). The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is
essential to that enforcement machinery, because
“fear of economic retaliation” would otherwise induce
workers whose rights had been violated to avoid
complaining to or cooperating with the Department of
Labor and to refrain from filing lawsuits seeking
redress for those statutory violations. Id. The Fourth
Circuit decision in the instant case expressly permits
the use of just such economic retaliation by prospec
tive employers. As the dissenting judge emphasized
in the court below, the panel majority “giv[es] its
thumbs-up to the company’s conduct and pav[es] the
way for other employers to adopt similar practices.”
(App. 14a).
The Fourth Circuit’s decision is inconsistent with
this Court’s interpretation of the term “employee” in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Corp. The court of appeals’
insistence that section 15(a)(3) protects an individual
only from retaliation by his or her employer is in con
flict with decisions of the Third, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits. The Fourth Circuit’s express legalization of
7 Department of Labor Merits Brief, p. 21.
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retaliation against job applicants poses a serious
threat to the enforcement of the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act, and presents legal issues which should be
settled by this Court.
I.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP
PEALS CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT
A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S “EMPLOY
MENT RELATIONSHIP” REQUIREMENT
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DE
CISION IN ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL
CO.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision rests on its insist
ence that the term “employee” necessarily refers only
to an individual who is “in an employment relation
ship” with the employer in question. (App. 7a). In
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), this
Court unanimously rejected that very interpreta
tion of “employee.” Both the government and the
dissenting judge below correctly objected that the
panel decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in
Robinson. See Sup.Ct. Rule 10(c). Judge King insisted
that “Robinson mandates the opposite result from
that reached by the majority today.” (App. 14a) (dis
senting opinion).8 The Department of Labor objected
8
“Ms. Dellinger’s construction of the word ‘employee’ in
§ 215(a) is ... compelled by Robinson.” (App. 22a) (King, J., dis
senting). “[T]he majority ... ignores Robinson.” (App. 21a) (King,
J., dissenting).
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that “the majority decision departs from [the] analy
sis [in Robinson]” (Department of Labor Rehearing
Brief, pp. 3-4).9
Robinson concerned the interpretation of the term

“employees” in Title VII. The plaintiff in Robinson
had complained about unlawful action by his former
employer, and then been retaliated against when he
sought a job with a new employer. Robinson, like
Dellinger, had no current employer at the point in
time when the retaliation occurred. This Court none
theless held that Mr. Robinson was an “employee[]”
under Title VII, which defines “employee” in terms
essentially identical to the definition in the FLSA.10
The Court’s decision in Robinson rested on the ambi
guity of the word “employee,” 519 U.S. at 340-45, and
on the danger that workers would be afraid to com
plain about unlawful employment practices if such
complaints could lead to retaliation that would pre
vent them from finding future employment. 519 U.S.
at 345-46. This Court’s decision in Robinson reversed
a Fourth Circuit opinion which had held that “em
ployee” refers only to a current employee. 70 F.3d 325
(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The situation in the instant

9 Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 11 (“[t]he major
ity did not apply the Supreme Court’s statutory analysis of the
term ‘employees’ ... [i]n Robinson”).
10 Section 701(f) of Title VII defines an employee as “an
individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
Section 3(e)(1) of the FLSA defines employee as “any individual
employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
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case differs from Robinson only in that here the re
taliation was by a prospective employer, whereas in
Robinson the retaliation was by the plaintiff’s former
employer.
In Robinson the defendant contended that the
term “employee” necessarily refers only to an individ
ual who is in an “employment relationship” with the
employer in question.
[T]he statute does contain [a] bright-line
test. And that bright line is whether or not
you have an employment relationship.... [I]f
you do not have an ongoing employment re
lationship, I don’t see how you can be covered
by the statute.
1996 WL 656475 at *34-*35 (transcript of oral argu
ment). The Fourth Circuit’s now overturned 1995
decision in Robinson was similarly based on that cir
cuit’s insistence that “employee” refers to an existing
employment relationship. The en banc majority in
Robinson repeatedly asserted that the term “employ
ee” means an individual who is in an “employment
relationship” with the defendant. The Fourth Circuit
in Robinson repeated the phrase “employment rela
tionship” ten times11 in explaining its interpretation
of “employee.” 70 F.3d at 330-31. “The term ‘employed’
...is commonly used to mean ‘performing work under
an employer-employee relationship.’ ” 70 F.3d at 330
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990)).
11 70 F.3d at 330-31.
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The Fourth Circuit in Robinson refused to construe
the protection afforded to an “employee” by the anti
retaliation provision of Title VII to reach “beyond the
employment relationship.” 70 F.3d at 331. “If Con
gress intended Title VII to remedy [retaliatory]
discrimination beyond the employment relationship,
then it could have easily done so....” 70 F.3d at 330.
This Court, however, expressly rejected in Robin
son the argument that “employee” necessarily refers
only to those “in an employment relationship” with
the employer in question.
At first blush, the term “employees” ... would
seem to refer to those having an existing
employment relationship with the employer
in question.... This initial impression, how
ever, does not withstand scrutiny....
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.

In the teeth of this Court’s specific rejection of
the Fourth Circuit’s 1995 holding that “employee”
means an individual in an “employment relationship”
with the employer in question, the Fourth Circuit in
the instant case resurrected and applied that very
discredited interpretation. In a decision written by
one of the Fourth Circuit judges who earlier joined
that 1995 Fourth Circuit opinion, the majority opinion
below held that “by using the term ‘employee’ ... Con
gress was referring to the employer-employee rela
tionship, ... and was therefor providing protection to
those in an employment relationship with their em
ployer.” (App. 6a-7a). To be protected by the FLSA,
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the majority insisted, an individual must “have an
employment relationship with the defendant.” (App.
10a). The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA only
applies “within the employer-employee relationship.”
(App. 10a).
The now-overruled 1995 Fourth Circuit decision
in Robinson had insisted that this limitation on the
application of the term “employee” was dictated by
“the plain meaning of [the] unambiguous statutory
language.” 70 F.3d at 329; see 70 F.3d at 330 (“em
ployee” “is not ambiguous”). But this Court emphati
cally rejected that claim. General usage of the term
“employee,” the Court held, “tends to rebut a claim
that the term ‘employee’ has some intrinsically plain
meaning.” 519 U.S. at 344 n.4. Robinson expressly
pointed out that “employee” could “mean ‘prospective
employee! ].’ ” 519 U.S. at 343 n.3. The Court con
cluded that in the context of Title VII, which defines
“employee” in language essentially identical to the
FLSA, the term is indeed ambiguous. 519 U.S. at 343,
345, 346.
Despite this aspect of the Court’s 1997 decision in
Robinson, the Fourth Circuit in the instant case again
insisted that the requirement that an FLSA plaintiff
be in an employment relationship with the employer
in question is literally dictated by the “plain terms” of
the statute. (App. 11a). The government correctly de
scribed the conflict between the panel decision below
and this Court’s opinion in Robinson.
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[T]he majority failed to apply the Supreme
Court’s statutory analysis in Robinson in
holding, based on the “statutory text,” that
the term “employee” excludes prospective
employees like Dellinger. In Robinson, the
Supreme Court analyzed ... the term “employ
ees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision ...
and found “employees” to be ambiguous....
The majority decision departs from such
analysis by failing to determine that “any
employee” in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation
provision is, at minimum, ambiguous as to
whether Dellinger may bring a claim against
her prospective employer.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, pp. 3-4).
[B]ecause the three criteria for application of
the Robinson analysis are satisfied here, the
majority should have applied Robinson and
determined that “employee” in the FLSA’s
anti-retaliation provision is, at minimum, am
biguous as to whether prospective employees
may bring claims.
{Id,., pp. 12-13). The dissenting opinion below noted

the same conflict.12
In its now-overturned 1995 decision in Robin
son, the Fourth Circuit had reasoned that the term
12
“The Robinson Court concluded that the word ‘employee’
in title VII was ambiguous.” (App. 14a). “[T]he word ‘employee,’
as used in the FLSA, is as necessarily ambiguous there as it is
in Title VII.” (App. 17a). “We have, in fact, called the two defini
tions ‘identical.’ ” (App. 16a).
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“employee” in the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII must be limited to individuals in an employment
relationship with the employer because the substan
tive provisions of Title VII are themselves directed at
regulating that employment relationship.
[T]he types of practices that Title VII forbids
strongly point toward the scope of its anti
retaliation provision not extending beyond
the employment relationship. The types of
practices that Title VII forbids are particu
larly related to employment....
70 F.3d at 330-31 (emphasis in original). Despite the
fact that this line of reasoning was necessarily rejected
by this Court’s decision in Robinson, the same argu
ment was made yet again by the Fourth Circuit in the
instant case. “[B]y using the term ‘employee’ ... Con
gress was referring to the employer-employee rela
tionship the regulation of which underlies the Act as
a whole....” (App. 6a-7a). Limitation of “employee” to
those “in the employment relationship” is required,
the court below reasoned, because that relationship
“is the context in which the substantive provisions
operate.” (App. 8a).
The Fourth Circuit decision in Robinson had
argued that limiting the term “employee” under Title
VII to an individual in a current employment relation
ship with the employer was compelled by the Title
VII definition of “employee.” 70 F.3d at 330. Despite
this Court’s decision to the contrary in Robinson, the
Fourth Circuit in the instant case again insisted that
the FLSA definition of “employee” - which is identical
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to the Title VII definition - compels such a limitation.
(App. 6a).
The Fourth Circuit in the instant case dismissed
this Court’s decision in Robinson in a footnote, com
menting merely that “ [b je c a u s e Robinson deals only
with former employees, it does not speak to the issue
in this case.” (App. 10a n.2). But the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit decision in the instant case - reiter
ating much of the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit’s
long ago overturned decision in Robinson —is entirely
inconsistent with this Court’s analysis in Robinson of
the meaning of “employee.” The Fourth Circuit in the
instant case repeatedly insisted that “employee”
refers only to individuals “in an employment relation
ship” with the defendant. Yet sixteen years ago, the
Fourth Circuit itself correctly recognized in its en banc
decision in Robinson that limiting employees to those
“in an employment relationship” with a defendant
would necessarily exclude former employees; that was
the very basis of the Fourth Circuit’s mistaken con
clusion that “employee” did not include a former
employee. A former employee like Mr. Robinson is no
more “in an employment relationship” with his or her
former employer than an ex-husband is in a marital
relationship with his ex-wife. There is simply no way
to reconcile the reasoning in the Fourth Circuit
decision in the instant case with this Court’s decision
in Robinson.
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B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S NARROW IN
TERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 15(a)(3)
AND 16(b) OF THE FLSA IS INCON
SISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S RE
PEATED CONSTRUCTION OF THE
TERM “ANY”
The FLSA delineates in particularly sweeping lan
guage the individuals who are protected from retalia
tion by section 15(a)(3) and who can obtain judicial
relief under section 16(b). In four separate passages
identifying those protected by, and authorized to sue
to enforce, the FLSA anti-retaliation provision, the
FLSA deliberately uses the all-encompassing word
“any.” The Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of
sections 15(a)(3) and 16(b) conflicts with a series of
emphatic decisions by this Court regarding the mean
ing and significance of the adjective “any.”
Section 15(a)(3) forbids retaliation by “any person”
(not merely retaliation by the employer of the person
retaliated against) and protects from retaliation “any
employee” (not only an employee of the retaliating
entity). The defendant in this case is certainly a “per
son.” The court below acknowledged that Dellinger
was an employee within the meaning of the FLSA, in
the sense that she was a former employee of her prior
employer. (App. 10a n.2). The Fourth Circuit, however,
held that the phrase “any person” in section 15(a)(3) delineating the entities from whose retaliatory acts
workers are protected - should be narrowly inter
preted to mean “their employer.” (App. 6a) (emphasis
added). In the Fourth Circuit’s view “any employee”

19

in section 15(a)(3) would thus have to mean “an
employee of the retaliating employer.”
Similarly, section 16(b) authorizes “any one or
more employees” (not merely one or more employees
of the defendant) to maintain an action, and provides
for suit against “any employer” (not merely against
the employer of the plaintiff). The court of appeals,
however, held that phrase “any employee” in section
16(b) means an employee of the defendant, and that
the phrase “any employer” in section 16(b) should be
interpreted to mean only an employer of the plaintiff.
“[T]he text of the applicable remedy allows for private
civil actions only by employees against their employ
ers.” (App. 12a) (emphasis added). “[T]here is ... no
remedy for an employee to sue anyone but his em
ployer.” (App. 9a) (emphasis added). “[Under] § 216(b)
... Dellinger could only sue Science Applications if she
could show that Science Applications was her employ
er.” (App. 7a-8a) (emphasis added). “§ 216(b) provides
th at... employees may sue only their employer.” (App.
7a) (emphasis added and omitted). “[T]he FLSA gives
an employee the right to sue only his or her current
or former employer.” (App. 2a) (emphasis added).
“[UJnder § 216(b) ... employees can sue their current
or former employers.” (App. 6a) (emphasis added).
As the government has correctly pointed out,
“[t]he majority ... read the word ‘any’ out of sections
15(a)(3) and 16(b) and thus failed to give proper con
sideration to its expansive meaning, as recognized
by the Supreme Court in other contexts.” (Depart
ment of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 3). In five emphatic
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decisions, this Court has held that the adjective “any”
signifies that the noun which it modifies is to be given
the most expansive meaning. Kasten u. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corporation, 131 S.Ct. 1325,
1332 (2011) (“the phrase ‘any complaint’ suggests a
broad interpretation”) (emphasis in original); Repub
lic o f Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848,__ , 129 S.Ct. 2183,
2189 (2009) (“the word ‘any’ ... has an ‘expansive
meaning” ’); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
(1997) (“[rjead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an ex
pansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately
of whatever kind”) (quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 97 (1996)); Harrison v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (noting that
“any” is “expansive language”); Shea v. Vialpando,
416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974) (“the normal meaning of
‘any’ [allows of] no limitation”).
The Fourth Circuit decision conflicts with this
entire line of this Court’s decisions. As the govern
ment has correctly explained,
The Supreme Court has repeatedly inter
preted “any” expansively, consistent with
th[e] plain meaning, including in the context
of FLSA retaliation claims. In Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. 131
S.Ct. 1325, 1332 (2011), the Supreme Court
noted that the use of “any” in the phrase
“filed any complaint” in section 15(a)(3)
“suggests a broad interpretation that would
include an oral complaint.” More generally,
the Supreme Court has made clear that
“any” has an “expansive meaning” that does
not limit the word it modifies.... [“]Read
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naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive
meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscrimi
nately of whatever kind.[”].... U.S. v. Gon
zalez, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1977).
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 7).
The repeated use of the adjective “any” in sections
15(a)(3) and 16(b) is particularly significant because
in other provisions of the FLSA Congress deliberately
used narrower, more limited language. The Fourth
Circuit held that the phrase “any employee” in sec
tions 15(a)(3) and 16(b) must mean (referring to a
current or, perhaps, former employer) “his employee”
or “its employee.” But when Congress, in drafting the
FLSA, wanted to restrict in this manner the meaning
of “employee,” it did so expressly. Seven different
provisions of the FLSA use the narrow phrase “his
employee,”13 and two provisions use the phrase “its
employee.”14 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit insisted
that the phrase “any employer” in sections 16(b)
means “his,” “her,” or “their employer.” But when Con
gress wanted to impose such a limitation it did so
expressly. In six other provisions of the FLSA Con
gress did limit in that just way the term “employer.”15
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m), 206(a), 206(b), 206(e)(1), 206(e)(2),
207(a)(1), 207(a)(2).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(2), 207(p)(l)(A).
15 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m) (“the employee’s employer”), 207(n)(l)
(“his employer”), 207(o)(5) (“the employee’s employer”), 213(a)(6)
(“his employer’s immediate family”), 213(a)(6)(B) (“his employer”),
213(b)(28) (same).
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C. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S LIMITATION
ON THE PURPOSE OF SECTION
15(a)(3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN
ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO. AND
MITCHELL V. DEMARIO JEWELRY
The Fourth Circuit opinion rests in part on a
uniquely narrow characterization of the purpose of
section 15(a)(3).
[T]he anti-retaliation provision was meant to
ensure that employees could sue to obtain
minimum wages and maximum hours from
their employers without the employers taking
adverse action against them for the exercise
of those rights. This purpose is inherent in
the employment relationship, which is the
context in which the substantive provisions
operate.
(App. 9a-10a) (emphasis added). On this view the
sole, limited purpose of section 15(a)(3) is to prevent
retaliation by the particular entity with whom the
victim has an employment relationship. The Fourth
Circuit insisted that section 15(a)(3) was never in
tended to interfere with retaliation by anyone else,
or to provide “protection against any societal retalia
tion.” (App. 9a). The goal of section 215(a)(3), accord
ing to the court of appeals, was not to end retaliation
against workers who complain to the Department of
Labor or file lawsuits under the FLSA, but only to
regulate which employers are permitted to engage in
such reprisals.
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That narrow interpretation of the purpose of sec
tion 15(a)(3) is inconsistent with this Court’s repeated
description of the goal of that anti-retaliation provi
sion. The intent behind section 15(a)(3), this Court
has held, is to prevent interference with the enforce
ment process.
Congress ... chose to rely on information and
complaints received from employees seeking
to vindicate rights claimed to have been
denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could
thus only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances. This
end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against dis
charges and other discriminatory practices
was designed to serve. For it needs no argu
ment to show that fear of economic retalia
tion might often operate to induce aggrieved
employees quietly to accept substandard con
ditions.
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.

288, 292 (1960). It is the “economic retaliation” that
impedes enforcement of the FLSA, not merely retalia
tion from some particular source, which Mitchell
explains section 15(a)(3) was enacted to prevent.
Referring to anti-retaliation laws generally, this
Court reiterated in Robinson that “a primary purpose
of anti-retaliation provisions [is] [maintaining unfet
tered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345. The danger that “fear of
economic retaliation” will “[]fetter[] access to statu
tory remedial mechanisms” depends on the gravity of
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the possible retaliation, not on the identity of the
retaliator. Robinson recognized that it “would under
mine the effectiveness of Title VII ... [to] allow[] the
threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims
of discrimination from complaining” Robinson, 519
U.S. at 345. The postemployment retaliation held
unlawful in Robinson was the refusal of a former
employer to provide a job reference, a refusal that
might have made it more difficult for the former
employee to get a particular job. The postemployment
retaliation held lawful by the Fourth Circuit in the
instant case - the outright refusal of an employer to
hire applicants who had engaged in protected activity
- would assuredly be an even greater deterrent.
The type of retaliation alleged in this case falls
squarely within the statutory purpose delineated by
Mitchell and Robinson. Workers would hesitate to
complain about a violation of the FLSA if doing so
would likely prevent them from obtaining another job.
Workers are well aware of the danger, recognized by the
Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, that they be subject to
retaliation by a prospective employer who “finds out
that the employee has in the past cooperated with the
Secretary [of Labor],”16 as well as the risk, acknowl
edged by the Fourth Circuit itself, of retaliation by
prospective employers “who learn they have challenged
16
Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1977); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548
F.2d 139, 146 (6th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspec
tors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the labor practices of previous employers.” Darveau v.
Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008). In
conflict with the purpose of section 15(a)(3) set out in
Mitchell and Robinson, the panel opinion “permit[s]
future employers effectively to discriminate against
prospective employees for their having exercised their
rights under the FLSA in the past.” (App. 11a).
II.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT
“EMPLOYEE” IN THE FLSA REFERS
ONLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS “IN
AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP” WITH
THE RETALIATORY FLSA EMPLOYER
CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE
THIRD, SIXTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS

The linchpin of the Fourth Circuit’s decision is
that the term “employee” in sections 15(a)(3) and 16(b)
refers only to an individual who is in (or, perhaps,
was once in) an employment relationship with the
retaliator or defendant, and that the terms “person”
in section 15(a)(3) and “employer” in section 16(b)
refer only to the particular employer with whom the
plaintiff employee has that relationship.
The Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have all
rejected that limitation on the meanings of “employ
ee,” “employer,” and “person” in the FLSA. The court
of appeals’ opinion squarely conflicts with the Third
Circuit decision in Bowe v. Burns, 137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir.
1943). The plaintiffs in Bowe alleged that, in retalia
tion for filing a lawsuit under the FLSA, their union
had expelled them and prevented them from securing
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other employment. The District Court in Bowe dis
missed the action, holding that retaliation by a union
was not forbidden by section 15(a) because “the word
‘person’ as used in Section 215 refers to ‘employer’
violators.” Bowe v. Burns, 46 F.Supp. 745, 749 (E.D.Pa.
1942). The union was not and never had been the
employer of the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit reversed,
emphasizing that the terms of section 15(a)(3) forbid
retaliation by “any person,” not merely by the em
ployer of the plaintiff, and thus protected from re
taliation those who were not and never had been
employees of the retaliator.
Those portions of the A c t... relating to wages
and to hours do apply only to employers. The
prohibitions in Section 15 ... , however, are
applicable “to any person.” ... Section 15(a)
makes it unlawful ... for “any person,”
whether or not he is an employer, to discrim
inate against any employee.... The congres
sional intent is very plain and the pattern of
the statute is perfect.
137 F.2d at 38-39. The Third Circuit permitted the
plaintiff to maintain a civil action against the union
under section 16(b) even though the union was not
Bowe’s employer.
The panel opinion conflicts as well with the Sixth
Circuit decision in United States v. Meek, 136 F.2d
679 (6th Cir. 1943). Meek had been convicted for hav
ing caused the unlawful discharge of an individual
named Crutcher. Meek attacked the conviction “on the
ground that he could not be guilty ... because he was
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not [Crutcher’s] employer.” 136 F.2d at 679. The United
States argued in Meek that the prohibitions of section
15(a)(3) are not limited to employers of the victim.17
The Sixth Circuit held that it was legally irrelevant
whether Meek was in any sense Crutcher’s employer
(or whether Crutcher was Meek’s employee).
It is immaterial whether Meek, at the time,
was Crutcher’s employer, ... since the prohi
bitions of the statute are directed to “any
person.” ... Bowe ... v. ... Burns. As there
pointed out, the differentiation between the
prohibitions in other sections of the Act
directed to the “employer,” and those here
[in section 15(a)] directed to “any person,” is
significant of the intent of the Congress.
136 F.2d at 679-80.
Similarly, in Sapperstein v. Hagen, 188 F.3d 852
(7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit held that the
protections of section 15(a)(3) are not limited to em
ployees who work for firms or individuals subject to
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of sec
tions 206 and 207.

17
Brief for Appellee, Meek v. United States, Crim. No. 9389
(6th Cir.) 15-16 (“The Section is expressly applicable to ‘any
person’ It is not limited to an employer or to a person ... being an
employer; it prohibits discharge or other discrimination against
‘any employee’ without any such limitations.... Applying a literal
construction, the conclusion thus appears to be plain that the
Section applies to all employees and all persons....”) (Emphasis
in original).
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[T]he statutory language is quite clear and
very broad. Congress made it illegal for any
person, not just an “employer” as defined
under the statute, to retaliate against any
employee for reporting ... violations of the
federal minimum wage or maximum hour
laws....
188 F.3d at 857. Sapperstein rejects the interpreta
tion of section 15(a)(3) adopted by the Fourth Circuit
in the instant case. The Fourth Circuit’s insistence
that section 15(a)(3) protects only an individual who
is “in an employment relationship” with the retaliator
necessarily means that the retaliator must indeed be
an employer, the employer of the victim.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS DECIDED
TWO CRITICAL QUESTIONS OF FEDER
AL LAW WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED
BY THIS COURT
The Fourth Circuit held, at the urging of the de
fendant employer, that the FLSA permits an employ
er to openly refuse to hire any job applicant who has
previously filed an action under the FLSA or cooper
ated with the Department of Labor’s efforts to enforce
the statute. (See pp. 5-6, supra). The court below also
ruled that the private cause of action provided by the
FLSA does not permit suits by job applicants. The
government, in its brief regarding rehearing, cor
rectly characterized the Fourth Circuit’s decision as
creating an “untenable gap in coverage.” (Department
of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4). Because of the serious
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implications of the decision below for the enforcement
of the FLSA, this is an issue that should be settled by
this Court.18
Refusing to hire applicants because of their past
involvement in the enforcement of the FLSA would be
a particularly effective method of punishing protected
activity.
It is difficult to imagine a more severe form
of retaliation than the refusal to hire a job
applicant because the applicant once exer
cised her FLSA rights.... If the majority deci
sion stands ... , an individual not currently
employed who is seeking a job could poten
tially remain unemployed indefinitely solely
because she engaged in FLSA protected ac
tivity.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 15).
Fear of this form of retaliation would be especially
likely to deter workers from asserting their rights
under the FLSA. “Individuals would be reluctant to
engage in any protected activity under section 15(a)(3)
for fear of being blacklisted by future employers.”
(Department of Labor Merits Brief, p. 2). “Far fewer
employees would assert their FLSA rights if they

18
The respondent correctly observed in the court of appeals
that “[t]his case squarely presents for decision the question
whether a[n] ... applicant for a position is entitled to the protec
tion of the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act....” Brief of Appellee, p. 2.
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could be excluded from future employment as a re
sult. Such a chilling effect would undermine FLSA
enforcement....” (Department of Labor Rehearing
Brief, p. 15).
Employees will be deterred from invoking
their FLSA rights and cooperating in FLSA
actions for fear of being retaliated against by
all future employers when seeking employ
ment.... Forcing an employee to choose
between asserting her FLSA rights and pos
sibly rendering herself ineligible for em
ployment with all future employers or
accepting FLSA violations without asserting
her rights would severely constrain FLSA
enforcement....
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4).19
If, as the Fourth Circuit held, this type of retalia
tion is lawful under the FLSA, an employer could
openly adopt such a retaliatory policy, expressly
notifying job applicants that it does not hire FLSA
complainants.

19
“Far fewer individuals would exercise their rights under
section 15(a)(3) if they could be lawfully excluded from all future
employment as a result.” (Department of Labor Merits Brief,
p. 20) (footnote omitted). “[I]f an employee can potentially be
denied employment by all future employers because she engages
in FLSA protected activity, far fewer employees would exercise
their FLSA rights and FLSA enforcement would be severely
undermined” (Secretary of Labor’s Motion for Leave to File
Amicus Brief, pp. 2-3).
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Employers could ask all job applicants, or
find out on their own, whether those appli
cants exercised their FLSA rights and then
reject every applicant who did so, thereby
creating a permanent class of “blacklisted”
individuals who exercised their FLSA rights.
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 15). Job
seekers could be required as part of the application
process to provide written assurances that they had
never filed, joined or testified in an action under the
FLSA, and had never complained to or cooperated
with the Department of Labor. Employers could cau
tion their own employees that the assertion of rights
under the FLSA, although protected from reprisals by
that current employer, could be fatal to future job
prospects.
The type of reprisal held lawful by the Fourth
Circuit in the instant case poses a substantially
greater threat to enforcement of the underlying stat
ute than did the retaliatory practices at issue in
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LLP, 131
S.Ct. 863 (2011), and Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov
ernment o f Nashville and Davidson County, 555 U.S.
271 (2009). In Thompson the employer had allegedly
dismissed one worker to retaliate against another em
ployee, the fiancee of the dismissed worker. This Court
noted the likelihood that reprisals against family
members could deter protected activity. 131 S.Ct. at
868. But this type of reprisal is not widespread;
it can be utilized, and could deter protected activity,
only where the worker who engaged in the protected
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activity happens to be related to (or have a particu
larly close relationship with) another employee of the
same employer. In Crawford the employer had retali
ated against a worker when, in response to questions
by a personnel official, she complained that she had
been sexually harassed. But this type of protected
activity is not common; most complaints regarding
sexual harassment are made at the initiative of the
victim, not in response to questions.
In the instant case, on the other hand, the form
of reprisal sanctioned by the Fourth Circuit could be
used to punish and deter all forms of protected activi
ty, not merely the particular form of protected activity
at issue in Crawford. Moreover, almost all employees
over the course of their careers work for a number
of different employers, and thus can expect (except
toward the end of their careers) to at some point be
looking for a new job. The typical American worker
has changed jobs an average of ten times by the age
of 44.20 Thus virtually all workers could be injured,
and deterred, by the type of reprisal declared lawful
by the Fourth Circuit, not merely (as in Thompson)
employees who work at the same office or plant as
a family member or workers who (as in Crawford)
are questioned by their employers about statutory
violations.

20
See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf and http://
www.bls.gov/nls/nlsfaqs.htm#anch41, visited October 31, 2011.

33

There are sound economic reasons why an em
ployer, if permitted, might want to avoid hiring
workers who had previously filed FLSA actions or
complained to the Department of Labor. Violations of
the wage and hour and overtime provisions of the
FLSA, unlike violations of many other federal employ
ment laws (such as Title VII), are ordinarily profita
ble. Every dollar not paid to a worker is an additional
dollar retained by the employer, and thus usually an
additional dollar of net income to that employer. Even
employers who believe in good faith that they are
complying with the FLSA understand that some
aspect of their personnel practices might be subject to
challenge under the Act. In either circumstance, it
makes economic sense for an employer to avoid hiring
workers whose prior conduct (such as filing a lawsuit
under the FLSA) indicates that they understand the
legal rights created by the FLSA and might take
action if those rights were violated. Thus the govern
ment has correctly warned that, in light of the Fourth
Circuit decision, “employers ... are more likely to re
fuse to hire those who have asserted their FLSA
rights.” (Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 4).
Under the Fourth Circuit rule a worker, once
hired, could not later be retaliated against if the
employer subsequently learned about pre-hiring pro
tected activity. An employer thus has a considerable
incentive to find out prior to hiring a worker if he or
she had, for example, previously filed an FLSA action.
Obtaining that type of information will often be
quite easy. Although in the instant case the employer
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openly asked the job applicant about her prior in
volvement in litigation, an employer could often
readily obtain such information on its own, without
the job applicant knowing that the employer had that
information or ever seeing - as in the instant case - a
connection between the information and the denial of
employment. Simply by using PACER, for example,
an employer could ascertain in about one minute
whether a job applicant had ever filed an FLSA action
in federal court.21
The Fourth Circuit held, not only that this form
of retaliation is lawful under section 15(a)(3), but also
that a prospective employee can never maintain an
action under section 16(b) to enforce the FLSA. That
procedural holding alone would effectively legalize
retaliation against prospective employees.
[T]he Secretary [of Labor]’s practical ability
to remedy retaliation by such employers
is limited. The Secretary relies heavily on
private actions under the FLSA (as does the
EEOC under the Equal Pay Act), and the
Secretary’s own enforcement actions com
prise a small percentage of FLSA lawsuits.
21
Upon accessing the PACER website, an employer need
only (a) click on “find a case,” (b) click on “search the PACER
case locator,” (c) under “region” pick “all courts,” (d) under
“party” type the name of the job applicant, and then (e) click on
“search.”
Information about individuals who have filed federal com
plaints can be obtained from other sources, such as Westlaw,
Lexis, and www.justia.com.
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The FLSA’s ... private remedies are thus
critical....
(Department of Labor Rehearing Brief, p. 14). Civil
actions filed by the Department of Labor are only 2%
of all FLSA actions.22 Thus “[bjarring employees from
bringing FLSA retaliation claims against prospective
employers would severely undermine FLSA enforce
ment.” (Id., p. 13) (capitalization omitted).
The threat to enforcement of the FLSA created by
the Fourth Circuit decision is sufficiently serious that
it should be addressed by this Court without awaiting
further developments in the lower courts. In the
Fourth Circuit today an attorney would have to warn
any client considering filing suit under the FLSA, or
complaining to the Department of Labor, that he or
she could legally be blacklisted by all other employers
for doing so. Lawyers throughout the nation will have
to admonish workers, at the least, that this form of
reprisal may indeed be lawful. Any worker of ordi
nary prudence would hesitate to engage in protected
activity if aware that future employers could legally
ask about and reject applicants based on such activ
ity. The chilling effect of the decision below, and the
perverse incentives it creates for preemptive retalia
tory conduct by employers, should not be permitted to
continue unabated for years while other lower courts
22
In 2010, there were 6,864 FLSA actions filed in federal
district courts. The Department of Labor filed 126 of those
actions. See http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTables
ForTheFederalJudiciary/December2010.aspx (Table C-2).
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explore the issue. The Solicitor General’s observation
about the similar problem created by the Sixth Cir
cuit decision in Crawford is applicable here.
[T]he question whether an employee in peti
tioner’s circumstance is covered [by the anti
retaliation provision] ... is of core importance
to the effective enforcement of [the Act] and
of recurring significance. The decision below
creates an inexplicable gap in [the] anti
retaliation provision.... If the decision below
is correct, there is every reason to believe
that Congress would want to act promptly to
correct the anomaly. Accordingly, there is
little reason to leave employees in the ...
Circuit unprotected while awaiting [decisions
in other circuits].23
Because the controlling legal principles have already
been repeatedly addressed by decisions of this Court,
little purpose would be served by delaying considera
tion of this vital question.
--------------♦--------------

23
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 061595, p. 18, available at 2007 WL 4439456.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reason, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In the alternative,
the Solicitor General should be invited to file a brief
expressing the views of the United States.
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Before NIEMEYER, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Keenan joined. Judge
King wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Natalie Dellinger commenced this action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”)
against Science Applications International Corpora
tion which, she alleges, retaliated against her, in
violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after learn
ing that she had sued her former employer under the
FLSA.
The district court granted Science Applications’
motion to dismiss, concluding that Dellinger was not
an “employee” of Science Applications, as defined in
the FLSA, and that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provi
sion does not cover prospective employees.
On appeal, Dellinger contends that the FLSA’s
anti-retaliation provision protects any employee that
has been the victim of FLSA retaliation by “any per
son,” including future employers.
Based on the statutory text, we conclude that
the FLSA gives an employee the right to sue only
his or her current or former employer and that a
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prospective employee cannot sue a prospective em
ployer for retaliation. We therefore affirm.
I.

According to Dellinger’s complaint, Dellinger
sued her former employer, CACI, Inc., in July 2009
for alleged violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage
and overtime provisions. Around the same time, she
applied for a job with Science Applications Inter
national Corporation. In late August 2009, Science
Applications offered Dellinger a job, contingent on her
passing a drug test, completing specified forms, and
verifying and transferring her security clearance.
Dellinger accepted the offer and began the process of
satisfying the contingencies.
On the form required for her security clearance,
Dellinger was required to list any pending noncrimi
nal court actions to which she was a party, and she
listed her FLSA lawsuit against CACI, Inc. Several
days after Dellinger submitted her completed form to
Science Applications, Science Applications withdrew
its offer of employment.
Dellinger commenced this action against Science
Applications, alleging that Science Applications’ mo
tive for withdrawing its offer was “retaliation and
unlawful discrimination based on Ms. Dellinger’s ex
ercise of her protected right to file an FLSA lawsuit,”
in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Science Applica
tions filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending
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that Dellinger’s complaint did not state a claim for
which relief could be granted under the FLSA be
cause the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision protects
only employees, not prospective employees. The dis
trict court agreed with Science Applications and
granted its motion, dismissing Dellinger’s complaint.
This appeal followed.
II
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 regulates
the relationship between employers and their em
ployees to “correct and as rapidly practicable to
eliminate” “the existence, in industries engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29
U.S.C. § 202. To this end, the Act establishes a mini
mum wage that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of
his employees,” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and maximum
hours, providing that “no employer shall employ any
of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty
hours” unless the employee receives overtime pay at
one and one-half times the regular rate, 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a). These duties are imposed on employers and
the beneficiaries are the employers’ employees. In
addition, the FLSA protects these substantive rights
by prohibiting retaliation, which it defines in relevant
part as discrimination “against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
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or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter.” Id. § 215(a)(3).
The Act is enforced through criminal prosecu
tions, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a); private civil actions by em
ployees, id. § 216(b); and civil enforcement actions by
the Secretary of Labor, id. §§ 216(c), 217. See also
Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 186 n .ll (5th Cir.
1983) (describing causes of action under the FLSA),
overruled on other grounds by McLaughlin v. Rich
land Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). To protect their
right to a minimum wage and maximum hours, em
ployees are authorized to sue not only for violations of
the Act’s wage and hours provisions, but also for
retaliation. The authorization for employee enforce
ment, which is included in § 216(b), provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of

section 206 [providing for minimum wages]
or section 207 [providing for maximum
hours] of this title shall be liable to the em
ployee or employees affected in the amount
of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages. Any employer who vi
olates the provisions of section 215(a)(3)
[prohibiting retaliation] of this title shall be
liable for such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes
of section 215(a)(3) [prohibiting retaliation]
of this title, including without limitation em
ployment, reinstatement, promotion, and the
payment of wages lost and an additional
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equal amount as liquidated damages. An ac
tion to recover the liability prescribed in ei
ther of the preceding sentences may be
maintained against any employer . . . in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdic
tion by any one or more employees for and in
behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.
Id. § 216(b) (emphasis added).

In this case, Dellinger has not sued her employer,
but rather a prospective employer, for retaliation. She
alleges that Science Applications, her prospective em
ployer, retaliated against her because she had sued a
former employer under the FLSA. This presents the
question of whether an applicant for employment
is an “employee” authorized to sue and obtain relief
for retaliation under § 216(b). Consistent with the
FLSA’s purpose to regulate the employer-employee
relationship and the relevant text of the Act, we con
clude that only employees can sue their current or
former employers for retaliation under the FLSA and
that an applicant is not an employee.
Section 215(a)(3) prohibits retaliation “against
any employee” because the employee sued the em
ployer to enforce the Act’s substantive rights. An “em
ployee” does not, in the Act, exist in a vacuum; rather
it is defined in relationship to an employer. Section
203(e)(1) provides that an employee is “any individual
employed by an employer.” Thus, by using the term
“employee” in the anti-retaliation provision, Congress
was referring to the employer-employee relationship,
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the regulation of which underlies the Act as a whole,
and was therefore providing protection to those in an
employment relationship with their employer.
Consistent with this context in which § 215(a)(3)
protects only employees, § 216(b) provides that such
employees may sue only their employer for retaliation
(as well as for violations of the Act’s substantive wage
and hour protections). Section 216(b) begins with a
sentence stating that any employer who violates
§ 206 (the minimum wage protection) and § 207
(the maximum hours protection) is liable to the “em
ployees affected” by the violations. Section 216(b)
then continues with a sentence stating that any “em
ployer” who violates § 215(a)(3) (the anti-retaliation
provision) is also liable for legal and equitable rem
edies.1 Those two sentences are followed by the
provision authorizing employees to file suit under the
Act: “An action to recover the liability prescribed in
either of the preceding sentences may be maintained
against any employer . . . in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated.” Because an
employee is given remedies for violations of § 215(a)(3)
1
The dissent notes that § 216(b) includes remedies of both
“employment” and “reinstatement” and reasons that the inclu
sion of “employment” as a remedy necessarily means that the
FLSA protects prospective employees. But this logic is not com
pelling because “employment” is not limited to prospective em
ployees. That remedy can also be afforded to a former employee
hired back to a different position, and its inclusion, therefore,
simply reflects Congress’ desire to cover all possibilities.
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only from an employer, Dellinger could only sue
Science Applications if she could show that she was
an employee and that Science Applications was her
employer.
Yet Dellinger cannot make that showing. Al
though she was an applicant for employment with
Science Applications and her application had been
approved on a contingent basis, she never began
work. Section 203(g) provides that “employ” means
“suffer or permit to work.” Therefore an applicant
who never began or performed any work could not, by
the language of the FLSA, be an “employee.”
Dellinger argues that because § 215(a), defining
“prohibited acts,” states that “it shall be unlawful for
any person” to retaliate against any employee, she
can sue any “person,” rather than simply her em
ployer. She argues that because Science Applications
is a “person” prohibited from retaliating, she there
fore can sue Science Applications.
While § 215(a)(3) does prohibit all “persons” from
engaging in certain acts, including retaliation against
employees, it does not authorize employees to sue
“any person.” An employee may only sue employers
for retaliation, as explicitly provided in § 216(b). The
use of the term “person” in § 215(a) is attributable to
the structure of the provision, which prohibits a num
ber of separate acts in addition to retaliation, not all
of which are acts performed by employers. For in
stance, § 215(a)(1) prohibits any person from trans
porting “any goods in the production of which any

9a

employee was employed in violation of section 206
[minimum wages] or section 207 [maximum hours] of
this title.” Thus, Congress prohibited the shipment of
goods produced by employees who are paid in viola
tion of the Act, and for enforcement, it authorized the
criminal prosecution of any “person” violating the
prohibition. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Just as there is no
remedy for an employee to sue such a shipper, there
is also no remedy for an employee to sue anyone but
his employer for violations of the anti-retaliation pro
vision. Accordingly, if the person retaliating against
an employee is not an employer, the person is not
subject to a private civil action by an employee under
§ 216(b).
Considering the Act more broadly, we cannot over
look the fact that the FLSA was intended at its core
to provide minimum wages and maximum hours of
work to ensure employees a minimum standard of
living necessary for “health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The anti
retaliation provision is included, not as a free
standing protection against any societal retaliation,
but rather as an effort “to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the
[FLSA] would be enhanced.” Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 293 (1960).
Thus, the anti-retaliation provision was meant to
ensure that employees could sue to obtain minimum
wages and maximum hours from their employers
without the employers taking adverse action against
them for the exercise of those rights. This purpose is
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inherent in the employment relationship, which is the
context in which the substantive provisions operate.
We have been unable to find any case that ex
tends FLSA protections to applicants or prospective
employees. Indeed, prior cases have reached the con
clusion that we have, applying the anti-retaliation
provision only within the employer-employee rela
tionship. See, e.g., Glover v. City o f North Charleston,
S.C., 942 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D.S.C. 1996) (noting that
the “any employee” language in the anti-retaliation
provision mandates that the plaintiff have an em
ployment relationship with the defendant); Harper v.
San Luis Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 848 F. Supp. 911 (D.
Col. 1994) (same); cf. Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515
F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (requiring, as part of
a prima facie FLSA retaliation case, a showing of
“adverse action by the employer”); Dunlop v. Carriage
Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that
an employee could sue his former employer when the
former employer retaliated against the employee by
advising a prospective employer that the employee
had previously filed an FLSA suit).2
2
The dissent, in urging that we rely on Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), to extend the FLSA to applicants
and prospective employees, overlooks the fact that Robinson
held that “employee” as defined in Title VII included former
employees. Indeed, we accept that “employee” under the FLSA
also affords protection from retaliation to former employees. The
issue here is whether the FLSA applies to persons who are not
yet employees and who have never worked for the employer.
Because Robinson deals only with former employees, it does not
speak to the issue in this case.
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We are sympathetic to Dellinger’s argument that
it could be problematic to permit future employers
effectively to discriminate against prospective em
ployees for having exercised their rights under the
FLSA in the past. The notion, however, that any
person who once in the past sued an employer could
then sue any prospective employer claiming that she
was denied employment because of her past litigation
would clearly broaden the scope of the FLSA beyond
its explicit purpose of fixing minimum wages and
maximum hours between employees and employers.
We are, of course, not free to broaden the scope of a
statute whose scope is defined in plain terms, even
when “morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct” may
be involved. Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d
360, 364 (4th Gir. 2000).
Dellinger urges us to extend the FLSA’s defini
tion of “employee” to protect job applicants, pointing
to other statutes under which applicants are pro
tected. In particular, she refers to the Energy Re
organization Act, the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(“OSHA”), and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act.
Reference to these statutes, however, does not ad
vance her cause. The case cited by Dellinger with
respect to the Energy Reorganization Act merely
assumed, without deciding, that an applicant was
covered under that Act. See Doyle u. Secretary of
Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 251 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002). While
the NLRA does protect prospective employees from
retaliation, the Act itself defines “employee” more
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broadly than does the FLSA, providing that the term
“employee” “shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer” unless explicitly stated. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(3). With respect to OSHA and the Pipe
line Safety Improvement Act, regulations implement
ing those statutes have been promulgated to extend
protections to prospective employees. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1977.5(b) (OSHA); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.101 (Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act). The Secretary of Labor has
not, however, promulgated a similar regulation for
the FLSA.
Because we conclude that the text and purpose of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 link the Act’s
application closely to the employment relationship
and because the text of the applicable remedy allows
for private civil actions only by employees against
their employers, we hold that the FLSA anti
retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), does not
authorize prospective employees to bring retaliation
claims against prospective employers. The judgment
of the district court is accordingly
AFFIRMED.

KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
It has been just short of fifteen years since Jus
tice Thomas delivered the opinion on behalf of a
unanimous Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), a decision that has
since stood as the definitive authority on statutory
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construction. Then, as now, a plaintiff having no
active employment relationship with the defendant
employer had commenced a lawsuit alleging unlaw
ful retaliation pursuant to a federal remedial statute
that, on its face, provides redress solely to “em
ployees.” Prior to the Court’s reversal of our en banc
judgment in Robinson, few imagined that a former
employee could successfully sue under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In like fashion here, Natalie
Dellinger, a prospective employee of Science Appli
cations International Corporation, has brought suit
against the company pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA” or “Act”).
Dellinger’s Complaint alleges that Science Applica
tions agreed to hire her but wrongly refused to follow
through notwithstanding that she had fulfilled each
disclosed condition of employment.
It appears, however, that Ms. Dellinger failed to
meet one additional, undisclosed condition: that she
not have demonstrated an inclination to hold her
bosses accountable under the law. Science Applica
tions terminated the hiring process upon being in
formed that Dellinger had recently filed suit against
her previous employer pursuant to the FLSA. Accord
ing to the Complaint, the allegations and reasonable
inferences of which we are bound to take as true,
Science Applications jettisoned Dellinger’s paperwork
in retaliation for her having exercised her lawful
rights. The district court nonetheless ruled that
Dellinger had failed to state a viable FLSA claim
against Science Applications and dismissed her case.
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The majority affirms with no discussion of Robinson
or its established methodology, giving its thumbs-up
to the company’s conduct and paving the way for
other employers to adopt similar practices. Because I
cannot escape the conclusion that Robinson mandates
the opposite result from that reached by the majority
today, I respectfully dissent.
I.

A.
In Robinson, the Court instructed that the “first
step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether
the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory lan
guage is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.” 519 U.S. at 340 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine
whether a statutory provision is ambiguous, a court
looks “to the language itself, the specific context
in which that language is used, and the broader con
text of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 341 (citations
omitted).
The Robinson Court concluded that the word “em
ployee” in Title VII was ambiguous because (1) there
was no temporal qualifier in the statute to indicate
that it applied either to current or former employees,
i.e., neither the term “current employee” nor the term
“former employee” appeared anywhere in Title VII;
(2) the statute’s prescribed definition of employee
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also contained no temporal qualifier, meaning that it
could include either current or former employees; and
(3) the statute referred to “reinstatement” and “hir
ing” of employees, both of which indicate an expan
sion of the definition beyond current employees. See
519 U.S. at 341-43. The Court continued: “Once it is
established that the term ‘employees’ includes former
employees in some sections, but not in others, the
term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and
each section must be analyzed to determine whether
the context gives the term a further meaning that
would resolve the issue in dispute.” Id. at 343-44
(emphasis added).
Finding it necessary, in light of Title VH’s ambi
guity, to embark on a contextual analysis, the Su
preme Court observed that “several sections of the
statute plainly contemplate that former employees
will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title
VII.” 519 U.S. at 345. The Court endorsed the
government’s position, as amicus curiae, that a re
strictive interpretation “would undermine the effec
tiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of
postemployment retaliation to deter victims of dis
crimination from complaining to the EEOC, and
would provide a perverse incentive for employers
to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.”
Id. at 346. The Court thus ordered reinstatement of
the plaintiff’s retaliation action, “[i]t being more
consistent with the broader context of Title VII and
the primary purpose of [the antiretaliation provi
sion].” Id.
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Robinson, of course, did not arise under the FLSA,
but its analytical framework readily admits of a more
widely reaching application, and it should therefore
powerfully inform our analysis of Dellinger’s appeal.
Indeed, we have acknowledged “the almost uniform
practice of courts in considering the authoritative
body of Title VII case law when interpreting the com
parable provisions of other federal statutes.” Darveau
v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted). The FLSA’s designation of an
“employee” as “any individual employed by an em
ployer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), is more than “compa
rable” to that of Title VII, which defines the same
term as “an individual employed by an employer,” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f). We have, in fact, called the two
definitions “identical.” Darveau, 515 F.3d at 342.

It is hardly surprising, then, that in Darveau we
determined that the FLSA, just like Title VII as
applied in Robinson, protects former employees from
retaliation. In so concluding, we discerned “no signifi
cant differences in either the language or intent of
the two statutes regarding the type of adverse action
their retaliation provisions prohibit.” 515 F.3d at 342.
Judge Motz explained, somewhat prophetically, that it
is necessary to afford such protection to former em
ployees “because they often need references from past
employers, they may face retaliation from new em
ployers who learn they have challenged the labor prac
tices o f previous employers, and they sometimes must

return to past employers for a variety of reasons,
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putting them once more at risk of retaliation.” Id. at
343 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
B.

.

1

We could not have ruled as we did in Darveau
without acknowledging, though tacitly, that the word
“employee,” as used in the FLSA, is as necessarily
ambiguous there as it is in Title VII. To that extent,
at least, Darveau binds the majority, but it nonethe
less appears to have reached the same conclusion on
its own that this is not a “plain language” case. Al
though it purports to rule “[b]ased on the statutory
text,” ante at 3, the majority also relies on its divina
tion of the purpose of the Act, together with an as
sessment of the statutory context, to circumscribe
who may be considered an employee thereunder. See
ante at 6-8.
As the majority correctly notes, the FLSA pri
marily concerns itself with establishing minimum
wages and maximum hours for current employees.
That notwithstanding, the Act also prohibits the
movement in commerce of goods with respect to “the
production of which any employee was employed” in
violation of the wage and hour requirements. 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (emphasis added). The word “em
ployee” in that sense can refer to former employees,
as made clear by the subsection following, which
provides that the government may establish a prima
facie case of an employer’s violation by showing that
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the overworked or underpaid employee was employed
“within ninety days prior to the removal of the goods
from” the employee’s place of employment. § 215(b).
It is, of course, scarcely remarkable that the
FLSA applies to former employees; that was, after all,
our plain holding in Darveau. The more salient point
for our purposes is that the Act’s ascription of more
than one meaning to the word “employee” establishes,
for Robinson purposes, that the statutory term is
“necessarily ambiguous.” I therefore agree with the
majority that we must examine contextual clues to
ascertain the breadth of the FLSA’s antiretaliation
provision.

2.
It is unlawful under the FLSA “for any person,”
not just employers, “to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
. . . any proceeding under or related to this chapter[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 215(a), -(a)(3). The Act criminalizes willful
violations of § 215, and it also provides civil recourse
to “employees affected” by the retaliatory acts de
scribed in subsection (a)(3). See § 216(a), -(b). Affected
employees are entitled to “legal or equitable relief
as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes o f ’
the antiretaliation provision, “including without limi
tation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and
the payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages.” § 216(b). Liability
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attaches to “[a]ny employer,” id., which “includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee.” § 203(d).
A plain reading of these several sections of the
Act, taken together, indicates that Congress was con
cerned enough with retaliatory conduct to impose
criminal penalties on actual decisionmakers (“any
person”), regardless of whether that person could also
be considered the employing entity or was acting at
the entity’s behest. Civil liability for retaliation, on
the other hand, is reserved for employers and their
agents who are sued by an “employee,” which gen
erally means “any individual employed by an em
ployer.” § 203(e)(1). Science Applications is undoubtedly
an employer subject to the Act, and Ms. Dellinger
broadly qualifies as an employee, having once sued
her former employer for allegedly violating the FLSA.
It does not follow perforce, however, that “Dellinger
could only sue Science Applications if she could show
. .. that Science Applications was her employer.” Ante
at 7 (emphasis added).
It would hardly be a stretch to interpret the
FLSA to permit Ms. Dellinger’s action, particularly
considering that other, similar remedial statutes al
ready apply to employees in her situation. For example,
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) defines
the term “employee” to “include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Moreover, as the majority
sets forth, regulations implementing the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) have construed that
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statute to afford court access to prospective em
ployees. See ante at 10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b)).
This has occurred notwithstanding that OSHA de
fines “employee” arguably more narrowly than does
the FLSA as “an employee of an employer who is
employed in a business of his employer which affects
commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (emphasis added).
The majority finds these analogs unpersuasive,
observing unremarkably that the NLRA’s particular
ized definition of “employee” more readily lends itself
to an expansive reading of who may sue. See ante at
10. The majority’s point appears to be that the ab
sence of similarly detailed language in the FLSA
demands the conclusion that Congress intended the
eligibility for bringing a retaliation suit under that
statute to be more restrictive. But Robinson counsels
against just that sort of negative inference:
[T]hat other statutes have been more specific
in their coverage of “employees” and “former
employees,” see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994
ed., Supp. I) (defining “employee” to include
“former employee”); 5 U.S.C. § 1212(a)(1) (in
cluding “employees, former employees, and
applicants for employment” in the operative
provision), proves only that Congress can use
the unqualified term “employees” to refer
only to current employees, not that it did
so in this particular statute.
519 U.S. at 341-42 (emphasis in original). Likewise,
Congress can certainly use the word “employee”
in a manner that excludes prospective employees or
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applicants for employment, but that it declined in
this case to expressly include them is not, under
Robinson, reliable evidence of legislative intent to the
contrary.
The majority sloughs off the approach taken in
administering OSHA, noting simply that “[t]he Sec
retary of Labor has not . . . promulgated a similar
regulation for the FLSA.” Ante at 10. True enough, we
have not been specifically tasked with deciding
whether the Secretary could reasonably construe the
Act in the manner that Ms. Dellinger seeks. But
in dismissing outright her arguments, even in this
non-deferential context, are we not implicitly passing
upon the objective reasonableness of the construction
for which she advocates? I suppose the majority
would be constrained to rejoin that permitting retali
ation suits absent some sort of employment privity is
indeed unreasonable if one accords significance to the
FLSA having been fashioned in the crucible of that
privity, a proposition enthusiastically endorsed by the
majority, ante at 8-10. Following that logic, and
mindful of OSHA’s similarly discrete mandate that an
employer “furnish to each of his employees . . . a place
of employment .. . free from recognized hazards,”
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Secretary
should be grateful that her occupational safety and
health regulations are not before us today, for they
would surely wither under the majority’s unforgiving
gaze.
The majority thus ignores Robinson and resorts
to its unsanctioned “original intent” methodology,
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presumably because it cannot adequately square the
result it reaches with the Act’s substantive context,
that is, the literal words of § 216(b) affording victims
of retaliation the alternative remedies of “reinstate
ment” and “employment.” Obviously, only former
employees can be reinstated, leaving the remedy of
employment to those who cannot be reinstated, i.e.,
those, like Dellinger, who have yet to be employed.
See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 (illustrating intended
breadth of term “employee” in Title VII through alter
native remedies of reinstatement and hiring, observ
ing that “because one does not reinstate current
employees, that language necessarily refers to former
employees”) (internal brackets and quotation marks
omitted); see also Broughman v. Carver, 624 F.3d 670,
677 (4th Cir. 2010) (reiterating “our duty to give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a stat
ute”) (citation omitted). Informed by the context of
§ 216(b), Ms. Dellinger’s construction of the word
“employee” in § 215(a) is, in my opinion, compelled
by Robinson. At the very least, her construction
seems eminently reasonable.
I am therefore left to wonder why, in the face of a
statute’s relative silence as to a material enforcement
term, we must presume that a particular avenue is
foreclosed because it is not explicitly mentioned,
rather than permitted because it is not specifically
prohibited. See Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. v. Dir.,
Office o f Workers’ Comp. Programs, 444 F.3d 1095,
1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[F]aced with two reasonable
and conflicting interpretations, [an act] should be
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interpreted to further its remedial purpose.”)- The
majority’s decision today bucks the trend begun by
Robinson, which is indisputably toward an expan
sive interpretation of protective statutes like Title
VII and the FLSA to thwart employer retaliation.
See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491
(2008) (concluding that, under applicable provision
of ADEA, federal employee may state claim for re
taliation as form of discrimination); CBOCS West, Inc.
v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (ruling that
anti-discrimination provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 en
compass action for retaliation); Jackson v. Birmingham
Bd. o f Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (same with
respect to Title IX).
Behind this impressive array of authority is the
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the vital role
that antiretaliation provisions play in regulating a
vast range of undesirable behaviors on the part of em
ployers. See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t o f Nash
ville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009) (observing that fear of retaliation is primary
motivation behind employees’ failure to voice con
cerns about bias and discrimination and reversing
Sixth Circuit’s judgment in employer’s favor as incon
sistent with primary objective of Title VII to avoid
harm to employees) (citations omitted); Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)
(explaining that liability for Title VII retalia
tion extends well beyond those actions affecting terms
and conditions of employment to include employer’s
acts outside workplace that are “materially adverse
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to a reasonable employee or job applicant”). There
is no reason to doubt that similar concerns obtain in
the FLSA context, as expressed in Reyes-Fuentes v.
Shannon Produce Farm, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368
(S.D. Ga. 2009) (“Congress chose to rely upon infor
mation and complaints from employees seeking to
vindicate their rights. Plainly, effective enforcement
could thus only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances”) (citations
omitted).
In Robinson itself, Justice Thomas took note of
the plaintiff’s and the government’s arguments that
the essence and continued vitality of Title VII’s
enforcement scheme depended on a beneficent view of
its scope.
These arguments carry persuasive force
given their coherence and their consistency
with a primary purpose of antiretaliation
provisions: Maintaining unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms. .. . [I]t
would be destructive of this purpose of the
antiretaliation provision for an employer to
be able to retaliate with impunity against an
entire class of acts.. . . We agree with these
contentions and find that they support the
inclusive interpretation of “employees” .. .
that is already suggested by the broader con
text of Title VII.
519 U.S. at 346 (citations omitted). Indeed, the con
duct in which Science Applications is alleged to have
engaged in this very case is especially troubling,
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vividly demonstrating through Dellinger’s example of
how easily it can identify “litigious” applicants and
resolve to exclude the entire class from its payroll. It
is beyond my comprehension that the majority can
shrug its shoulders and countenance this sort of be
havior when the Supreme Court has provided the
means and encouragement to do something about it.
II.
Finally, the majority overlooks our decision in
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989),
in which we opened the door to a less restrictive
interpretation of “employee” in the FLSA context. In
Ensley, we ruled that the employer’s unpaid trainees
must be considered employees and entitled to mini
mum wage payments even though the culmination of
the hiring process was made contingent upon the
successful completion of the training. Id. at 1210. In
so concluding, the Ensley majority rejected the dis
sent’s view that the trainees did not fit within
§ 203(e)(l)’s definition of “employee.” See 877 F.2d at
1210 (Wilkins, J., dissenting) (characterizing “the
true legal issue” as being the classification of the
trainees as employees under the FTCA).
At Science Applications, Ms. Dellinger found
herself in the same position as the trainees in Ensley.
There was no legitimate impediment between her and
the imminent assumption of her job duties. Cf. Ensley,
877 F.2d at 1208 (reciting that the trainees could, in
theory, have demonstrated themselves unqualified,
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but observing that “no person, who had completed the
training, was not subsequently hired”). Ensley is, of
course, binding upon subsequent panels, and it
requires us to recognize the validity of Ms. Dellinger’s
FLSA retaliation claim, just as we recognized as valid
the trainees’ claim for wage payments under the Act.
III.
For all the foregoing reasons, I am convinced that
Ms. Dellinger, an employee within the meaning of the
FLSA, has pleaded a legally sufficient retaliation
claim against Science Applications. Inasmuch as the
majority holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.

27a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
NATALIE DELLINGER
Plaintiff,
v.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,

I:10cv25 (JCC)

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Filed Apr. 2, 2010)
This case is before the Court on a Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendant Science Applications In
ternational Corporation (“SAIC”). (Dkt. 3.) Plaintiff,
Natalie Dellinger (“Dellinger” or “Plaintiff”), alleges
that SAIC violated the anti-retaliation provision of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) codified at 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), by refusing to hire her after they
received notice that she had filed a separate FLSA
action against a former employer. On February 3,
2010 Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis
that Plaintiff was never an “employee” of Defendant.
Plaintiff opposed on February 22 and Defendant
replied on February 26, 2010. For the reasons stated
below, and in accordance with this Court’s decision
from the bench at the March 5, 2010 motion hearing,
the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
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I.

Background

The relevant factual allegations in the Complaint
are as follows. Plaintiff has worked as an administra
tive assistant on various government contracts re
quiring security clearance, most recently in 2008 and
part of 2009, when plaintiff was an employee of
CACI. Inc. (Compl. 11 1-2.) In late July 2009, Plain
tiff filed a claim against CACI, Inc. for violations of
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
FLSA. (Compl. 11 13-14.) At the same time, Plaintiff
applied for a job with SAIC at the Sherman Kent
School of the CIA for, at least in part, administrative
support requiring an individual with security clear
ance. (Compl. *n^I 16-18.) After interviewing her for the
position, SAIC offered Plaintiff the position of Ad
ministrative Assistant on or about August 21, 2009.
(Compl. 1 20-22.)
This offer was contingent, however, upon Plain
tiff’s successful completion of a drug test, her sub
mission of a “standard 1-9 form,” and, because the
position plaintiff was offered required a security
clearance, her offer was also contingent upon the
successful verification, crossover, and maintenance of
her security clearance including the completion and
submission of a government document known as Stan
dard Form 86 (“SF 86”.) (Compl. H 25-27.) The SF 86
is used for national security positions, and contains a
variety of background questions includes, among other
things, a request for the applicant to list any non
criminal court actions to which the applicant has been
or is currently a party. (Compl. 1 28.) As required,
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Ms. Dellinger listed on the SF 86 that she had filed a
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia alleging FLSA violations against
her former employer, CACI. (Compl. 1 29.)
Ms. Dellinger hand-delivered her signed em
ployment offer letter, her SF 86, and other required
documents to an SAIC employee named Brian Powers
on August 24, 2009. (Compl. 1 32.) That same day,
Ms. Dellinger took and passed the drug test required
for employment with SAIC. (Compl. 133.) SAIC
withdrew its offer of employment after August 24
(Compl. 1 34.) Two SAIC employees independently
confirmed that SAIC had taken no action regarding
her employment application after August 24, 2010.
(Compl. 1 35-36.) The Complaint alleges that SAICs
failure to employ Ms. Dellinger was retaliatory action
for her filing of her FLSA action against CACI.
II.

Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. See Randall v. United
States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis
miss, the Court is first mindful of the liberal pleading
standards under Rule 8, which require only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Thus,
the Court takes “the material allegations of the
complaint” as admitted and liberally construes the
Complaint in favor of Plaintiffs. Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citation omitted).
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While Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” a plaintiff must still provide “more than
labels and conclusions” because “a formulaic recita
tion of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 196465 (2007) (citation omitted). Courts will also decline
to consider “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 2009 WL 5126224, *3 (4th
Cir. 2009) (citing Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n. 26 (4th Cir.2009); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009).
Indeed, the legal framework of the Complaint must
be supported by factual allegations that “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127
S.Ct. at 1965.
In its recent decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct
1937 (2009), the Supreme Court expanded upon
Twombly by articulating the two-pronged analytical
approach to be followed in any Rule 12(b)(6) test.
First, a court must identify and reject legal conclu
sions unsupported by factual allegations because they
are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at
1951. “[B]are assertions” that amount to nothing
more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” do
not suffice. Id. (citations omitted). Second, assuming
the veracity of “well-pleaded factual allegations”, a
court must conduct a “context-specific” analysis
drawing on “its judicial experience and common
sense” and determine whether the factual allegations
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“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. at
1950-51.
Satisfying this “context-specific” test does not
require “detailed factual allegations.” Nemet Chevrolet,
Ltd., 2009 WL 5126224 at *4 (citing Iqbal at 1949-50
(quotations omitted)). The complaint must, however,
plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on
“judicial experience and common sense,” to infer
“more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges a cause of action under the anti
retaliation provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a plau
sible claim for relief as she is not, nor has she ever
been an “employee” within the meaning of the Act.
This Court agrees with Defendant and finds that
Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that
she was an “employee” of SAIC within the meaning of
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
A. Plain Meaning
“In a statutory construction case, the beginning
point must be the language of the statute, and when
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue[,] judicial
inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Ramey v.
Director, office of Workers’ Compensation Program,
326 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Estate of
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Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475

(1992)). The statute at issue here, 29 U.S.C. § 215
states, in pertinent part:
(a)

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . .

(3) to discharge or in any other manner dis
criminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or institut
ed or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter .. .
29 U.S.C. § 215 (emphasis added). Congress chose to
define “employee” as “any individual employed by an
employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)1. For an individual to
be “employed” by an “employer” they must be “suffer[ed] or permitt[ed] to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
Here, Plaintiff was never “permitted” to work for
SAIC, in fact, her main allegation is that the offer of
employment was withdrawn. (See Compl. 34.)
The two district courts that have addressed this
issue have found that a job applicant should not be
considered an “employee” for purposes of the anti
retaliation provision of the FLSA. In Harper v. San
Luis Valley Regional Medical Center, an applicant for
a nursing position at defendant hospital was involved
in an unrelated federal wage claim suit against
several municipalities. Harper, 848 F.Supp. 911 (D.
Colo. 1994). The hospital hired several allegedly less
1 An “employer includes any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. . . . ” 29 U.S.C.§ 203(d).
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qualified individuals over plaintiff Harper and Har
per filed suit alleging FLSA retaliation. In reaching
its decision the Court specifically relied on the plain
language of the statute, noting that “where a statute
names parties who come within its provisions, other
unnamed parties are excluded.” Id. at 913-914
(D.Colo. 1994) (citing Foxgord v. Hischemoeller, 820
F.2d 1030, 1035, cert, denied, 484 U.S. 986, (9th Cir.
1987); See Contract Courier Services, Inc. v. Research
and Special Programs Admin, o f U.S. Depart, of
Transp., 924 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding

“statutory words mean nothing unless they distin
guish one situation from another; line-drawing is the
business of language”). The Court in Harper held that
§ 215(a)(3) “specifically identifies those individuals
who come within its provisions i.e. employees. There
fore, other unnamed parties such as non-employee job
applicants are excluded from its protection.” Harper,
848 F.Supp. at 914.
In the similar case of Glover v. City of North
Charleston, plaintiff was also the lead plaintiff in a
separate FLSA wage and hour suit against the North
Charleston (Fire Dept.) District. Glover, 42 F. Supp.
243 (D.S.C. 1996). After Glover brought suit against
the District, the District Fire Department was dis
banded and the City of North Charleston Fire De
partment was formed; however, the City had
discretion to determine which of the District Depart
ment’s employees would be hired. Id. at 245. In his
suit against the City, Glover alleged a violation of
§ 215(a)(3) claiming the City’s decision not to hire
Glover was retaliation for his earlier FLSA claims. In

34a

dismissing the case, the Glover court found that
plaintiffs were job applicants and thus not yet “em
ployees” within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 246.
In so doing, the Court drew a careful distinction
between § 215’s initial language holding that it “shall
be unlawful for any person” to commit certain acts
(§ 215(a)), and more limited language of the provision
at issue here, protecting “any employee” from the
person’s misconduct (§ 215(a)(3)). Id. at 245-246
(emphasis added). The court found that the statute’s
application to “any person” did not bar suit against
the “non-employer” City, however, the plain language
of the statue [sic] restricting its protections to “any
employee” did mean that a mere job “applicant” did
not have standing to bring a § 215 action. Id. As the
Glover court found, the first sentence of the statute
applies to “any person,” if “Congress wanted to cover
non-employees, it could have written § 215(a)(3) to
prevent discrimination [or retaliation] against “any
person” instead of “any employee.” Id. at 246-247.
Based on the plain language of the statute, the courts
that have considered the issue have found that
§ 215(a)(3) does not cover job applicants.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases as
outliers and non-binding on this Court. As decisions
from other Districts they are clearly not binding
precedent, however, their reasoning is, contrary to
Plaintiff’s argument, applicable here. Both opinions
rest on the plain language of the statute and both
were unwilling to read the term “employee” to mean
an individual who was never employed the Defendant.
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Defendant points to the leading Fourth case
regarding the sufficiency of an anti-retaliation claim
under FLSA, Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334
(4th Cir. 2008.) In the Fourth Circuit, to assert a
prima facie claim of retaliation under the FLSA a
plaintiff must show: “that (1) he engaged in an activi
ty protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered adverse
action by the employer subsequent to or contempora
neous with such protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the employee’s activity and
the employer’s adverse action.” Darveau v. Detecon,
Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Wolf v.
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (11th Cir.
2000); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390,
1394 (10th Cir. 1997)). Similarly, Defendant argues
that as the Fourth Circuit standard requires a “casu
al [sic] connection” between the “employee’s activity”
and the “employer’s” action, Plaintiff has no standing
to bring suit as she was never an “employee.” (Mem.
in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) Without reading beyond
the plain language of the statute, a job applicant
cannot be considered an “employee.”
B. Alternative Arguments
Plaintiff offers a number of arguments why this
Court should expand the definition of “employee” to
include job applicants. While the Court believes that
the plain language of the statute is clear, it will never
theless address each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn.
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First, Plaintiff argues that the FLSA taken as a
whole indicates that “employee” should include job
applicants. In support of this argument, Plaintiff
points to § 216(a) of the statute which makes it
unlawful for “any person” to violate the terms of § 215
and provides that the remedies of both “employment”
and “reinstatement” are available to aggrieved em
ployees. 29 U.S.C. § 216. As the Court in Glover found
and Defendant argues here had Congress wanted to
include non-employees such as job applicants, it could
have used the “any person” language from § 216
rather than the “any employee” language it chose.
Glover, 942 F. Supp. at 246-247
Second, Plaintiff argues that this Court should
look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for guidance
regarding the ambiguity of the definition “employee.”
(Opp. at 5.) Title VII’s definition of “employee” is
identical to the FLSA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29
U.S.C. § 203. In Robinson v. Shell Oil, the Supreme
Court found that Title VTI’s definition of “employee”
was ambiguous as to whether or not it covered indi
viduals who were fired by their employers and thus
were now former employees. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
Ultimately the Court determined that Title VII did
protect the actions of “former employees” in part
because “Title VII’s definition of “employee” [ ] lacks
any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either
current or past employment.” Id. at 342. The Court
held that the word “employed” could mean, both “is
employed” but also could just as easily be read to
mean “was employed.” Id. at 342.

37a

This approach to interpreting FLSA has been
used in the Fourth Circuit in Darveau, where the
Court considered “Title VTI’s authoritative body” of
case law in analyzing “comparable provisions of other
federal statutes” including the FLSA. Darveau, 515
F.3d at 342. Darveau specifically finds that the defini
tions of “employee” in Title VII and FLSA are identi
cal. Id. As Defendants argue and is discussed above,
the Fourth Circuit notes that Robinson, found that
“employee” included former and current employees
(those who “are employed” and those who “were
employed”), but did not find it also included appli
cants who were never employees.
There are several relevant distinctions between
the Robinson case and the case at bar. First, in Rob
inson the Court was trying to determine if an em
ployee that was fired by an employer could bring a
FLSA claim against that former employer for subse
quent discriminatory action. Id. at 339. The Court
found that “employed” could mean both “is” em
ployed” or “was” employed, not that “employed” could
mean “never” employed. See Id. at 342. Furthermore,
the statute at issue in Robinson, already specifically
prohibits refusing to hire a job applicant who has
exercised her Title VII rights in prior employment, no
such provision exists in the FLSA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3. Had Congress intended to similarly protect
job applicants it could have incorporated similar
language into the anti-retaliation provisions of the
FLSA.
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Third, Plaintiff argues that other statutes from
the “same era” as the FLSA, such as the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), should influence this
Court’s interpretation of the term “employee.” Specifi
cally, Plaintiff argues that it is similarly unlawful for
an “employer” to retaliate against an “employee” in
the NLRA and that “case law interpreting the NLRA”
indicates that the refusal to hire an applicant for
employment is contrary to the NLRA. (Opp. at 11
(citing NLRB v. Lamer Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8 (5th
Cir. 1957).) Plaintiff also argues that Fifth Circuit
case law applying the NLRA protections to a “job
applicant who is discriminately denied employment
in violation of the NLRA” should be applied in the
FLSA context. (Opp. at 11 (citing NLRB v. George D.
Auchter Co., 209 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1954).)
As Defendant argues, the analogy to NLRB is not
apt. As an initial matter, the definition of employee
under the NLRA includes “any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular em
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other
wise,” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), rather than the more
narrow, “an individual employed by an employer”
used in the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203. This definition
contemplates a wider sweep of individuals then is
included in the FLSA’s definition, as it specifically
states that an employment relationship need not exist
with a particular employer. Here, while the Plaintiff
was never hired to work for SAIC, the statute requires
that the “employee” be “permitted to work” by the
specific “employer.” See Id.
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that a decision that
refuses to include job applicants under the definition
of “employee” would be contrary to the public policy
purpose of the FLSA as it would have a chilling effect
on individuals from bringing FLSA actions for fear of
losing future employment opportunities. Plaintiff
does not offer any case law where any court ruled on
this basis. As stated above, Congress could have
determined that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision
could apply to “any person” rather than “any employ
ee,” however, Congress has not made that policy
determination and this Court will not do so, absent
Congressional intent.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court will
grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate
Order will issue.
April 2, 2010
Alexandria, Virginia

____________/s/ ____________
James C. Cacheris
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT JUDGE
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The petition for rehearing en banc and amici
curiae brief were circulated to the full court. No judge
requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court
denies the petition for rehearing en banc.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

